Reverse payment settlements have ignited a firestorm debate among all affected parties: consumer groups, brand-name pharmaceutical companies, generic manufacturers, pharmaceutical wholesalers and retailers, lawmakers, executive agencies, and the federal courts. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has waged a decade-long battle against such private settlements of pharmaceutical patent litigation as illegal market-sharing agreements, with skirmishes among the circuits trending in favor of the settling parties until recently. The Third Circuit's recent decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation unsettled this trend, and the Supreme Court granted the FTC's petition for a writ of certiorari in a separate case on the issue on December 7, 2012. A reverse payment settlement is an agreement ending a pharmaceutical patent infringement suit under which a putative patent holder agrees to compensate an alleged infringer, typically a generic firm, to settle a patent infringement case. In exchange, the alleged infringer agrees not to challenge the patent holder's patent or sell a generic version of the drug for a stated term. Because the payment flows from the plaintiff to the defendant, it has been called a "reverse" payment. This Note argues that any standard of antitrust review for reverse payment settlements must involve an evaluation of the patent's strength at the time the patent holder and generic firm enter into a settlement. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the court of competent jurisdiction to review a district court's evaluation of a patent's strength. Part I reviews reverse payment settlements generally and the statutory schemes that promote their emergence. Part II presents three approaches the circuit courts have adopted to review reverse payment settlements: per se illegality, a rebuttable presumption of illegality, and the scope of the patent test. Part III argues that any standard of antitrust scrutiny must consider the patent's strength at the time of the settlement -an approach no circuit has yet adopted -and that the Federal Circuit is the proper appellate court to review patent strength.
INTRODUCTION
Reverse payment settlements have ignited a firestorm debate among all affected parties: consumer groups, brand-name pharmaceutical companies, generic manufacturers, pharmaceutical wholesalers and retailers, lawmakers, executive agencies, and the federal courts. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has waged a decade-long battle against such private settlements of pharmaceutical patent litigation as illegal market-sharing agreements, 1 with skirmishes among the circuits trending in favor of the settling parties 2 until recently. 3 The Third Circuit's recent decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation unsettled this trend, 4 and the Supreme Court granted the FTC's petition for a writ of certiorari in a separate case on the issue on December 7, 2012.
5
A reverse payment settlement is an agreement ending a pharmaceutical patent infringement suit under which a putative patent holder agrees to compensate an alleged infringer, typically a generic firm, to settle a patent infringement case. 6 In exchange, the alleged infringer agrees not to challenge the patent holder's patent or sell a generic version of the drug for a stated term. 7 Because the payment flows from the plaintiff to the defendant, it has been called a "reverse" payment.
This Note argues that any standard of antitrust review for reverse payment settlements must involve an evaluation of the patent's strength at the time the patent holder and generic firm enter into a settlement. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the court of competent jurisdiction to review a district court's evaluation of a patent's strength. Part I reviews reverse payment settlements generally and the statutory schemes that promote their emergence. Part II presents three approaches the circuit courts have adopted to review reverse payment settlements: per se illegality, a rebuttable presumption of illegality, and the scope of the patent test. Part III argues that any standard of antitrust scrutiny must consider the patent's strength at the time of the settlement-an approach no circuit has yet adopted-and that the Federal Circuit is the proper appellate court to review patent strength.
I. BACKGROUND: REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND THE STATUTORY SETTING
To understand the debate over the propriety of reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry, one should be familiar with the statutory provisions that regulate FDA approval of new and generic bioequivalent drugs. One should also understand the basic antitrust law principles enshrined by the Sherman Antitrust Act (the "Sherman Act"), and how they interact with basic patent law principles under the pharmaceutical industry's unique regulatory approval scheme.
A. Reverse Payment Settlements
A reverse payment settlement is a resolution between disputing parties in a pharmaceutical patent infringement suit under which a putative patent holder agrees to compensate an alleged infringer to settle a patent infringement case. 8 In exchange, the alleged infringer agrees not to challenge the patent holder's patent or sell a generic version of the drug for a stated term. 9 Because the payment flows from the plaintiff to the defendant, it has been called a "reverse" payment. 10 More "evocatively," 11 the FTC has referred to these settlements as "pay-for-delay" agreements. 12 The FTC has filed lawsuits and published studies censuring these settlements since 2001, 13 15 commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, created an incentive scheme that encourages such settlements. 16 As of this writing, Congress has not articulated a test for determining whether reverse payment settlements implicate antitrust laws, although both chambers have introduced bills attempting to proscribe such agreements. 17 Congress's failure to enact a policy has effectively left the question for the federal courts to decide, 18 and six circuits have addressed whether reverse payment settlements are legal. 19 On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted the FTC's petition for a writ of 
20

B. The Statutory and Regulatory Landscape
Before reviewing the three main approaches to evaluating reverse payment settlements, it is necessary to understand the statutory provisions that regulate FDA approval of new and generic bioequivalent drugs and to review the basic antitrust principles enshrined by the Sherman Act. The pharmaceutical industry's unique regulatory scheme has given rise to a unique tension between antitrust law and patent law in that industry.
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act ("Hatch-Waxman" or the "Act") in 1984 to achieve two seemingly disparate objectives-specifically, (1) to increase the availability of low cost generic drugs, and (2) to increase incentives for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 21 Three particular provisions in the Act advance the first objective, while three more advance the second.
22
But before reviewing each, a brief overview of the FDA approval process before 1984 is apposite.
Before Hatch-Waxman, a generic firm could not legally develop a generic version of a brand-name drug until the innovator's patent expired. expire, federal food and drug law required the generic firm to obtain FDA approval to market the drug by filing an extensive "New Drug Application" ("NDA").
24
The FDA's safety and efficacy requirements often required generic firms to coordinate "needlessly costly, duplicative and time-consuming" clinical trials that largely eviscerated the benefit of manufacturing and marketing cheap generic drugs. 25 As a result, "[s]ome observers noted that although patents on important drugs had expired, manufacturers were not moving to introduce generic equivalents for these products." 26 In fact, in 1984, generic drugs made up only 18.6 percent of the prescription drugs sold in the United States.
27
Hatch-Waxman significantly eroded these statutory and regulatory obstacles to generic drug market entry. a) Promoting generic competition i. The "safe harbor" provision Title II of the Act amended the Patent Act of 1952 and created a "safe harbor" provision for the use of a patented invention "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information" to the FDA. 28 This provision carefully expanded lawful uses of a patented invention to include testing that would allow a generic manufacturer to establish generic bioequivalency. 29 The [T] he only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute. The patent holder retains the right to exclude others from the major commercial marketplace during the life of the patent. Thus, the nature of the interference with the rights of the patent holder is not substantial."). generic firm's experimental use of a patented invention for business reasons was "a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention."
30 Roche had effectively required generic manufacturers to delay generic bioequivalency tests until the patentee's patent expired, 31 which would result in a de facto patent extension 32 of about two years after the expiration of the patent. 33 In overruling Roche, Congress noted that the safe harbor provision "was essential to implement the policy objective of getting safe and effective generic substitutes on the market as quickly as possible after the expiration of the patent." The applicant must also certify that (1) the NDA holder has not filed patent information with the FDA (Paragraph I); (2) the NDA holder's patent has expired (Paragraph II); (3) the NDA holder's patent will expire on a certain date (Paragraph III); or (4) the NDA holder's patent is invalid or the ANDA applicant's proposed drug will not infringe it (Paragraph IV). 46 The FDA may immediately approve an ANDA certified under Paragraphs I or II. 47 The FDA cannot approve an ANDA certified under Paragraph III until the patent expires.
48
A Paragraph IV certification is an act of patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 49 An ANDA applicant making a Paragraph IV certification must notify the patent and NDA holder(s) within twenty days. 50 The notice must include a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of the applicant's opinion that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed. 51 If the patent holder does not file a patent infringement suit within forty-five days, the FDA may approve the ANDA immediately. 52 If before final judgment or the expiration of the thirty-month stay the FDA approves the proposed generic drug, the approval is tentative.
54
Such an approval becomes effective the earlier of when (1) the thirty-month stay expires; (2) the court rules the patent is invalid or has not been infringed; or (3) the court enters a settlement order or consent decree stating that the patent is invalid or has not been infringed. 55 If the court decides the patent is valid and has been infringed, the FDA delays approval of the ANDA until the patent expires.
56
If the court has not resolved the patent litigation before the end of the thirty-month period, the ANDA filer may begin marketing the drug, but assumes the risk that it may be found liable if the court eventually rules the patent is valid and infringed. 57 Alternatively, the NDA holder and ANDA applicant may settle the suit before final judgment. 58 The Hatch-Waxman Act does not prohibit settlements. is no resolution of the patent litigation and a stay is not granted, and the patent holder has not obtained preliminary injunctive relief, the ANDA filer may begin to market its product. In such an instance, the ANDA filer assumes the risk it might be found liable for infringing the pioneer manufacturer's patent.").
58
See THOMAS, supra note 8, at 8. with 180 days of generic marketing exclusivity. 60 During this period, the FDA cannot approve another ANDA-IV for the drug.
61
The exclusivity period begins to run when the first applicant who submits a "substantially complete" ANDA-IV begins commercially marketing its drug.
62
Until 1998, the FDA took the position that the 180-day exclusivity period was available only to first filers who successfully defended patent infringement suits. 63 Under this interpretation, first filers who were not sued for patent infringement were ineligible for the exclusivity period. 64 The D.C. Circuit overturned the FDA's "successful-defense" requirement as inconsistent with the plain language of Hatch-Waxman in Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala. 65 According to Mova, the statute clearly provided that the 180-day exclusivity period began on the earlier of the date of the first filer's first commercial marketing of the drug, or, as the statute provided at the time, the date of a court decision finding the patent to be invalid or not infringed. Marketing exclusivity is "a bounty worth hundreds of millions of dollars for a major drug." 69 In fact, "generics often make more than half of their total profits on a drug during the period of generic exclusivity." 70 And the opportunity for 180 days of marketing exclusivity, in addition to the availability of the ANDA process and safe harbor protection, has helped fundamentally transform the pharmaceutical industry. In 1996, twelve years after Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, the share of generic units sold domestically more than doubled from 18.6 percent to (II) the date of a decision of a court in [a patent infringement action] holding the patent which is the subject of the certification to be invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier. 73 Unless the FDA rejected the NDA, the innovator could begin marketing the drug sixty days after submitting its application. 74 Congress amended the FDCA in 1962 to require an NDA to prove the proposed drug's safety and efficacy. 75 Proving efficacy requires additional years of clinical trials.
76 A "showing of efficacy requires that the drug be investigated in controlled clinical trials by multiple groups, and that these trials, when subjected to a statistical analysis, prove the drug to be efficacious."
77 Because innovators conduct most clinical testing after a patent issues, 78 the new efficacy requirement shortened the innovator's "effective patent life"-the time between FDA approval and patent expiration. To restore innovation after the 1962 amendments, the HatchWaxman Act introduced a procedure to extend patent terms. 82 Innovators may now request patent term extensions from the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") within sixty days of FDA approval. 83 The PTO follows four steps to calculate the total period eligible for extension 84 : (1) identify the innovator's "regulatory review period," composed of the innovator's testing and approval phases after the patent issues; 85 (2) reduce each phase by the amount of time that the FDA finds the applicant did not exercise due diligence in obtaining 80 Id. regulatory approval; 86 (3) take one-half of the adjusted testing phase and add it to the adjusted approval phase to arrive at the total eligible period for extension; 87 and (4) cap the extension at five years 88 and the remaining term of the restored patent following FDA marketing approval at fourteen years. 89 Some commentators have openly doubted whether HatchWaxman's patent term restoration provision delivers a real benefit to pharmaceutical innovators. In a prepared statement for a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, then President of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA"), explained that "the net effect of Hatch-Waxman has been a deterioration in intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals." Mossinghoff cited as primarily responsible "the many restrictions placed on the patent term restoration period," the availability of the streamlined ANDA for FDA approval of generic drugs, and the statutory safe harbor from patent infringement. Before Hatch-Waxman, the typical innovator drug enjoyed a total of 14-17 years of market exclusivity-nine years of effective patent life plus a five-to eight-year period between patent expiration and the marketing of a generic copy. As a result of Hatch-Waxman, the total period of intellectual property protection has shrunk to 11.7 yearssince generic drugs can now enter the market immediately after patent expiration. Thus, the net practical effect of Hatch-Waxman was to reduce the period of intellectual property protection for innovator drugs by periods that range from 2.3 to 5.3 years. Id. at 121.
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Other commentators say the patent term extension "has been successful in increasing the patent term."
91 But drug patent terms alone do not provide a full picture. Before Hatch-Waxman, brand companies enjoyed effective market exclusivity after their patent terms expired for a five-to eight-year period between patent expiration and the marketing of a generic copy. 92 Thus, Mossinghoff, and commentators like him, argue that the safe harbor provision and ANDA process shortened the innovator's "de facto" monopoly in lieu of a shorter, de jure patent term extension. Evidently, the benefits of Hatch-Waxman's patent term restoration are disputed.
ii. Non-patent marketing exclusivity for new chemical entities
The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the FDCA to provide nonpatent marketing exclusivity periods to listed drugs that introduce new active ingredients, 93 or "new chemical entities." 94 The FDA defines a new chemical entity ("NCE") as "a drug that contains no active moiety that has been approved by FDA" in a previous NDA application. 95 An "active moiety," in turn, is "the molecule or ion, excluding those appended portions of the molecule that cause the drug to be an ester, salt . . . or other noncovalent derivative . . . of the molecule, responsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the drug substance."
96
Under this provision, the FDA may not approve an ANDA-IV for the first four years after NDA approval, and it may not approve an ANDA with Paragraph I, II, or III certifications for the first five years.
97
The provision benefits innovators who discover new active ingredients by "restrict[ing] a potential generic manufacturer 91 Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 22, at 50. from bringing a product to market for five years plus the length of the FDA review of the generic application." 98 iii. The thirty-month stay of FDA approval An ANDA-IV applicant must provide a notice statement within twenty days to each patent holder that is the subject of the Paragraph IV certification and NDA holder on whose NDA the applicant relies. 99 The notice must "include a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed." 100 To trigger a stay of FDA approval of the generic firm's ANDA, the patent holder must initiate a patent infringement suit within forty-five days of receiving the ANDA filer's notice.
101
During this period, the generic cannot enter the market.
102
FDA approval of the ANDA becomes effective after thirty months unless the patent expires before then or a district court earlier decides that the patent is invalid or not infringed, in which case approval is effective on the date a court enters judgment in favor of the generic. 103 The thirty-month stay approximates the length of a patent case to reach final judgment, 104 and has been compared to an automatic preliminary injunction because it provides the patent holder "an absolute, although time-limited, 98 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32917, BIOTERRORISM COUNTERMEASURE DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES IN PATENTS AND HOMELAND SECURITY, at 11-12 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32917.pdf ("The purpose of NCE exclusivity is to encourage the development of innovative drug products that include an entirely new active ingredient (commonly termed the 'active moiety'), in contrast to 'me-too' drugs that consist of chemical variants of previously known compounds."). act of infringement, the brand firm could stack multiple thirtymonth stays.
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Infamously, GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK") exploited this loophole after a generic manufacturer, Apotex, challenged GSK's listed patent for the active ingredient in Paxil in 1998.
113 After Apotex's initial Paragraph IV certification, GSK listed nine additional patents for the drug with the FDA.
114 Apotex filed additional Paragraph IV certifications for each.
115
GSK brought four additional patent infringement suits against Apotex, resulting in an effective five-year stay on FDA approval for a generic version of the antidepressant. 116 The Medicare Act closed this loophole by allowing only one thirty-month stay for patents listed with the FDA at the time the generic firm files an ANDA-IV. The Hatch-Waxman Act originally provided that the 180-day exclusivity period would be triggered on the earlier of the date of first commercial marketing of the generic drug (the "first commercial marketing" trigger) or the date of a court decision holding the brand firm's drug patent 112 
S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006). The statute states in relevant part:
If the applicant made a certification described in subclause (IV) . . . the approval shall be made effective immediately unless, before the expiration of 45 days after . . . the notice . . . is received, an action is brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the certification and for which information was submitted to the Secretary . . . before the date on which the application . . . was submitted. If such an action is brought before the expiration of such days, the approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the thirty-month period . . . . 
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EVALUATING REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 1371 invalid or not infringed (the "court decision" trigger). 119 The FDA could not approve a subsequent ANDA until the end of the 180-day period. 120 To delay triggering the 180-day exclusivity period, NDA holders compensated ANDA filers through settlements.
121
This practice created a bottleneck preventing FDA approval of subsequently filed ANDAs.
122
The Medicare Act established "forfeiture events" restricting a first applicant's entitlement to exclusivity, including if the first applicant (1) fails to market within seventy-five days of final FDA approval or thirty months after submitting its ANDA, whichever is earlier; (2) fails to market within seventy-five days of a court decision finding the patent invalid or not infringed, a court signing a settlement order or consent decree finding the patent invalid or not infringed, or the NDA holder withdrawing its patent information from its NDA; (3) withdraws its application or the FDA considers it withdrawn because it does not meet its requirements for approval; (4) amends or withdraws the certifications that qualified it for exclusivity; (5) fails to obtain tentative FDA approval within the first thirty months of filing, unless the failure is caused by a change in or a review of the requirements for approval after filing; (6) enters into an agreement with another ANDA applicant, the NDA holder, or a patent holder, and the FTC or DOJ files a complaint that results in the FTC or a court's final, unappealable decision (except for a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) that the agreement violates antitrust laws; or (7) no longer qualifies for the 180-day exclusivity period because all of the patents for which it submitted a certification have expired. 123 The Medicare Act thus curbed perceived abuses to the 180-day exclusivity period that some litigants effected through reverse payment settlements. 
c) Requiring notice to antitrust enforcement agencies
Additionally, the Medicare Act requires any agreement between a brand-name drug company and generic firm regarding the manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the drug listed in the generic's ANDA to be filed with the FTC and United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") for antitrust review. 125 In effect, this requires parties to give notice of reverse payment settlements to antitrust enforcement agencies. 127 Less than two years after the States ratified the Constitution in 1788, 128 the First Congress during its Second Session enacted the Patent Act of 1790, setting the conditions for obtaining a patent. 129 Subsequent statutory enactments, collectively known as the Patent Acts, modified and added to these conditions. 130 The Patent Act of 1952 (the "Patent Act"), as amended, currently governs patent law.
131
The Patent Act provides that "[a] patent shall be presumed to be valid" and that " [ The Supreme Court has held that "Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation of the word 'every,'" and has instead held that the Sherman Act outlaws only unreasonable restraints of trade.
136
Most restraints are evaluated under a "rule of reason" standard, under which the fact finder must make an "elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness" of a firm's behavior in the context of a particular industry. 147 its revenues from the exclusivity period could reach hundreds of millions of dollars for "blockbuster" drugs. 148 Thus, a generic firm evaluating the potential risks and benefits of filing an ANDA-IV may rationally decide to roll the dice and trigger a statutory act of patent infringement.
149
The branded patent holder, on the other hand, is in no better position than before if it prevails in the patent infringement action. Money damages are not available since the generic firm usually has not yet entered the market. The patent holder's benefit is virtually limited to continued patent protection against that ANDA challenger. 150 On the other hand, if the brand loses the suit, it relinquishes its patent monopoly.
151
Some commentators have pointed to these "exceedingly" asymmetric litigation risks to explain the unconventional reverse flow of consideration from the plaintiff-patent holder to the defendant-generic challenger.
152
Other courts and commentators have been more skeptical.
153
Many believe reverse payments resemble collusion and reject any notion that economically rational behavior exonerates antitrust liability. 154 The FTC has stated that "the competition laws exist This case centered on Cardizem CD, a brand-name prescription drug used to treat angina and hypertension and prevent heart attack and stroke. 162 In 1995, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Andrx"), a generic manufacturer, filed an ANDA-IV seeking FDA approval to manufacture, market, and sell a generic version of Cardizem CD, which at the time was manufactured and marketed by Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. ("HMR"). 163 Andrx was the first generic firm to file an ANDA-IV, entitling it to the coveted 180 days of marketing exclusivity. 164 it is rational for the patentee to agree to an exclusion payment, that payment cannot be anticompetitive."). 155 162 Id. at 901. 163 Id. at 901-02. 164 Id. at 902.
In 1996, HMR brought a patent infringement claim against Andrx. 165 As the suit pended in federal court, the FDA issued tentative approval of Andrx's ANDA. 166 Nine days later, the parties entered into an agreement, wherein Andrx promised it would not market a generic version of Cardizem CD upon receiving final FDA approval or transfer or relinquish its 180-day exclusivity period to another company. 167 In exchange, HMR agreed to compensate Andrx with $40 million per year, payable quarterly after the FDA issued final approval, and further agreed to compensate Andrx $100 million per year to abstain from the market after a final, unappealable judgment that Andrx did not infringe HMR's patent. 168 When the thirty-month stay period ended in 1998 and the FDA issued final approval of Andrx's ANDA, HMR began making $10 million quarterly payments, Andrx did not enter the market, and the 180-day marketing exclusivity period was not triggered. 169 The parties eventually settled the patent infringement suit in 1999 for a final additional sum of $50.7 million.
170
State law plaintiffs, indirect purchasers, and class representatives filed complaints against HMR and Andrx alleging antitrust injuries.
171 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged "that but for the Agreement, specifically the payment of $40 million per year, Andrx would have brought its generic product to market once it received FDA approval and at a lower price than the patented Cardizem CD sold by HMR." 172 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that Andrx's delayed market entry "parked" the start of its 180-day marketing exclusivity period and blocked "other potential generic competitors." 173 165 Id. 166 Id. 167 Id. 168 Id. at 902-03. 169 The Sixth Circuit held that the HMR-Andrx Agreement "was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade." 174 In addition to the quarterly payments to refrain from marketing its generic version of Cardizem CD, the court found dispositive the fact that "by delaying Andrx's entry into the market, the Agreement also delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who could not enter until the expiration of Andrx's 180-day period of marketing exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or transfer."
175 At least to the extent that reverse payment settlements involved "parking" the 180-day exclusivity period, the Sixth Circuit's approach was a clear categorical condemnation of such agreements.
Cases in other circuits, such as In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation in the Second Circuit, have openly questioned the continued vitality of Cardizem after the Medicare Act because it involved parking the 180-day exclusivity period and blocking subsequent ANDA filers.
176
The Medicare Act of 2003 subsequently established forfeiture events intended to prevent parking the 180-day exclusivity period, a practice the following cases did not so nakedly involve.
177
B. The Scope of the Patent Test
The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit articulated the most deferential standard for evaluating reverse payment settlements in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation.
178
This case involved the patent for tamoxifen, a prescription drug for the treatment of breast cancer.
179
In 1987, Imperial Chemical Industries ("ICI") brought suit against Barr, a generic manufacturer and the first ANDA-IV filer for 174 Id. at 908. 175 
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EVALUATING REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 1379 tamoxifen. 180 The district court declared ICI's tamoxifen patent invalid after finding ICI had intentionally withheld critical testing information from the PTO.
181 While ICI's appeal was pending in the Federal Circuit, the parties entered into a settlement agreement.
182 Zeneca, ICI's successor-in-interest to the tamoxifen patent, agreed to compensate Barr with $21 million and a nonexclusive license to sell tamoxifen under Barr's label if Barr would change its ANDA to a Paragraph III certification, thereby agreeing not to sell its generic version of tamoxifen until Zeneca's patent expired. 183 The parties also agreed that if a subsequent ANDA-IV challenger prevailed against Zeneca in a patent infringement suit, Barr could "revert to a paragraph IV ANDA certification." 184 Finally, the parties moved to vacate the district court's opinion that Zeneca's patent was invalid.
185
The district court granted the motion.
186
Consumer groups filed lawsuits alleging the Zeneca-Barr settlement violated antitrust laws. 187 The plaintiffs also alleged that Zeneca and Barr "'understood' that if another generic manufacturer attempted to market a version of tamoxifen, Barr would seek to prevent the manufacturer from doing so by attempting to invoke the 180-day exclusivity right possessed by the first 'paragraph IV' filer." 188 The district court upheld the agreement, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
189
The Second Circuit based its analysis on the principle that courts are "bound to encourage" settlements because settlements are in the interest of the parties and of the public. 190 The court pointed out that, where there are conflicting patent claims, the 180 Sherman Act does not preclude settlements, even though settlements could harm competition. 191 It also recognized that restricting patent settlements might undermine the purpose of patent law because it would generate uncertainty and hamper innovation. 192 Turning to reverse payment settlements specifically, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected applying the per se rule and explained that reverse payments are a natural byproduct of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory regime.
193 "Hatch-Waxman essentially redistributes the relative risk assessments and explains the flow of settlement funds and their magnitude. Because of the HatchWaxman scheme, [the generic challengers] gain[] considerable leverage in patent litigation . . . ." 194 The Second Circuit refused to "categorically condemn[]" reverse payments in what it perceived to be a regulatory regime that redistributed litigation risks and undercut patentee certainty. 195 While the Second Circuit conceded that economically rational behavior is not necessarily lawful, 196 it reasoned that a patent settlement raises antitrust concerns only if the settlement is a vehicle for avoiding antitrust law. 197 Under this reasoning, a large
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reverse payment settlement would not raise antitrust concerns if the patentee is only seeking to insure its preexisting property interests. 198 The court conceded again that this rule could have the effect of permitting settlements that protect "undeserved" patent monopolies, but determined that succeeding ANDA challengers would erode a weak patent holder's monopoly profits and reinstate competition. 199 Finally, the court presented a test for evaluating reverse payment settlements: An agreement is an antitrust violation only if it excludes competition beyond the scope of the patent's protection. 200 As long as competition is restrained within the scope of the patent monopoly, the agreement is lawful unless the plaintiffs can show that (1) the patent was procured by fraud on the PTO or (2) the patent infringement suit is "objectively baseless." 201 Applying this test to the facts of the Zeneca-Barr settlement, the court held the agreement did not extend the scope of Zeneca's tamoxifen patent because it precluded only generic marketing of tamoxifen, not any other non-infringing product. 202 Moreover, the court distinguished this agreement from that in Cardizem, which involved Andrx "parking" the 180-day exclusivity period and blocking subsequent generic competition. 203 Here, by changing its ANDA to a Paragraph III certification, Barr "appeared to" revoke its eligibility for the exclusivity period.
204
Thus the court concluded that any harm to the plaintiffs was the result of the exclusionary power that reposes in a patent monopoly, not antitrust abuse. standard to the facts of this case, Judge Pooler reasoned that, in light of the district court finding that Zeneca's tamoxifen patent was invalid, the court should have denied the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and permitted discovery. 
Declining to Revisit Tamoxifen
The Second Circuit recently heard an antitrust challenge to a reverse payment settlement between Bayer, the patentee for the active ingredient in ciprofloxacin hydrochloride (Cipro), and Barr, the generic firm that filed the first ANDA-IV to market a generic version of the drug. 211 The circuit panel, which included Judge Pooler, explained that it was "bound" to apply the standard adopted in Tamoxifen 212 and ruled that the agreement was lawful. 213 But the panel also expressed its concern that Tamoxifen may have been wrongly decided. 214 It offered for support four reasons-namely, that (1) the United States has urged the Second Circuit to repudiate Tamoxifen for "inappropriately permitt [ing] patent holders to contract their way out of a statutorily imposed risk . . . while claiming antitrust immunity"; 215 (2) the incidence of reverse payment settlements has increased since the Tamoxifen decision; 216 (3) Senator Hatch, one of the bill's drafters, has expressed strong disapproval of the agreements; 217 and (4) the Tamoxifen panel may have misinterpreted the Hatch-Waxman Act. 218 At the end of its opinion, the court invited the plaintiffs to petition for a rehearing en banc.
In September 2010, over Judge Pooler's strong dissent, the Second Circuit denied rehearing the case en banc.
220 "I think that our Tamoxifen decision unambiguously deserves reexamination," she dissented. 221 224 The Court's decision may finally reconcile the pharmaceutical industry's unique tension between patent law and antitrust law, a matter that has concerned the FTC for over a decade. 225 Actavis involves a reverse payment settlement between the NDA holder for AndroGel, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, and two generic manufacturers, then Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories. 226 AndroGel is a prescription topical gel used to treat low testosterone in adult males. 227 Although the patent for the synthetic testosterone used in AndroGel expired years ago, Watson 229 Watson, the first filer, became eligible for the 180-day marketing exclusivity period. 230 Solvay brought a patent infringement suit against both companies within forty-five days, triggering the thirty-month stay provision.
231
When the thirty-month stay on the FDA's approval of Watson's ANDA expired in 2006, the suit was still pending in federal district court. 232 Watson estimated "that its generic version of AndroGel would sell for about twenty-five percent of the price of branded AndroGel, which could decrease the sales of branded AndroGel by ninety percent and cut Solvay's profits by $125 million per year."
233
Before the district court could rule on Watson and Paddock's motions for summary judgment, which were fully briefed, the parties agreed to settle the suit.
234
The generic manufacturers agreed not to market generic versions of AndroGel until 2015-five years before Solvay's patent would expire-in exchange for multimillion-dollar yearly payments.
235
After the settlements were reported to the FTC pursuant to the Medicare Act, the agency brought an antitrust action under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) against the parties.
236 The FTC "urged [the court] to adopt a rule that an exclusion payment is unlawful if, viewing the situation objectively as of the time of the settlement, it is more likely than not that the patent would not have blocked generic entry earlier than the agreed-upon entry date. this approach, the FTC would have the burden of proving that Solvay was unlikely to prevail in the underlying patent infringement litigation. According to the FTC, since Solvay's AndroGel patent was "vulnerable" at the time of the settlement, it was "unlikely to prevail" in the patent infringement suit and the FTC could state an antitrust claim. 238 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the FTC's approach for several reasons. 239 First, it declared that the FTC's position is inconsistent with the circuit's precedents. "Our decisions focus on the potential exclusionary effect of the patent, not the likely exclusionary effect." 240 In other words, so long as the patent for the drug was active, the court refused to inquire into its actual exclusionary power. Second, the court decided that "retroactively predicting from a past perspective a future that never occurred is . . . perilous." 241 It reasoned that assessing the infringement claim as of the time of settlement would impose a profound burden on litigants and scarce judicial resources, and would be unreliable anyway. 242 Finally, Watson explained that the FTC's approach would require the circuit courts to make substantive determinations for which they are not institutionally equipped. 243 "We are illequipped to make a judgment about the merits of a patent infringement claim . . . . The FTC's approach is in tension with Congress' decision to have appeals involving patent issues decided by the Federal Circuit." 244 The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases. 245 Thus, the court struck down the FTC's approach for (1) being inconsistent with precedent, (2) promoting unstable judicial policy, and (3) generating tension with Congress's decision that the Federal Circuit hears patent appeals. infringement claims. 256 Third, federal antitrust laws condemn "naked agreements not to compete" 257 as per se unreasonable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 258 
C. The "Quick Look" Rule of Reason Test
The petition described Watson as a superior vehicle for resolving the circuit split because Watson involves a federal agency enforcement action, which gives the government greater control over the litigation. 259 K-Dur, on the other hand, is a private class action. 260 Moreover, FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch has remarked that Watson is superior because it was decided on a motion to dismiss, and therefore "presents a pure issue of law," unlike K-Dur, which was decided on summary judgment. 261 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation marked a distinct split in the circuit courts' trend toward the "scope of the patent" test. 262 The Third Circuit rejected this test because it "assumed away" the question being litigated in the underlying patent suit. 263 Instead, the court advocated a "quick look" rule of reason analysis. Under this test, the fact finder treats "any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, which could be rebutted by showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some procompetitive benefit." 264 The Third Circuit derived its approach to reverse payment settlements from the conventional "rule of reason" analysis in
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EVALUATING REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 1389 antitrust jurisprudence. 265 Classically, "the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors." 266 This involves, according to K-Dur, three parts:
First, the plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct has produced anti-competitive effects within the market. If the plaintiff meets the initial burden, "the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective." Finally, the plaintiff can rebut the defendant's purported pro-competitive justification by showing that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-competitive objective. 267 The quick look test under the rule of reason represented a compromise between the rule of reason test, under which plaintiffs must "make a full showing of anticompetitive effects in the market," and the per se rule, where market effects need not be examined. The quick look rule of reason test is used when "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets" by virtue of their nature. 268 Here, the court justified applying this test by "embrac[ing]" the "common sense conclusion that a payment flowing from the innovator to the challenging generic firm may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties entering the agreement." 269 While admitting that the quick look test does not encourage settlement to the same degree as the scope of the patent test, the court stated that "the judicial preference for settlement . . . should not displace countervailing policy objectives or, in this case, Congress's determination . . . that litigated patent challenges are necessary to protect consumers from unjustified monopolies by brand name drug manufacturers." 270 In light of Hatch-Waxman's structure and legislative record, Congress's objective was to increase litigated challenges to pharmaceutical patents, an aim reverse payment settlements frustrate.
271
The court was also skeptical of Tamoxifen's conclusion that subsequent ANDA-IV filers would restore competition after a reverse payment settlement. 272 It noted that only the first ANDA-IV challenger is eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period. 273 Moreover, a brand-name drug company's profit margin could be wide enough to "pay off a whole series of challengers rather than suffer the possible loss of its patent through litigation." 274 Contrary to the Tamoxifen panel, the Third Circuit believed settlements likely reduced subsequent generic competition.
III. RESOLUTION: A PATENT-CENTRIC STANDARD OF ANTITRUST REVIEW
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act Neither Prohibits nor Endorses Settlements
The Hatch-Waxman Act does not expressly prohibit settlements in a patent infringement suit. Congress enacted the Act for two competing policy reasons: (1) to increase the availability of low cost generic drugs, and (2) to increase incentives for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 275 To promote generic competition, the Act provided generic firms a safe harbor provision, an Abbreviated New Drug Application for streamlined FDA approval, and a 180-day marketing exclusivity period for the first applicant to submit to the FDA a "substantially complete" ANDA-IV. 276 To promote innovation in the pharmaceutical 270 Id. at 217. 271 Id. 272 Id. at 215. 273 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)). 274 industry, the Act provided a patent term extension to allow patent proprietors time to recoup their research and development costs, non-patent marketing exclusivity to the first NDA applicant to obtain approval for an NCE, and a thirty-month stay of FDA approval for a patent infringement challenge to a generic firm's ANDA-IV. 277 It did not, and still does not, prohibit settlements in a patent infringement suit. 278 The Act reflects a careful balance struck by Congress, a balance that some commentators fear has been upset by reverse payment settlements. 279 But the six prominent provisions in Hatch-Waxman that this Note has highlighted are each designed to remedy a preexisting, congressionally identified problem.
280
Congress provided the patent term extension, for instance, to restore patent terms that had then been effectively eroded by FDA requirements and approval processes. 281 It introduced the ANDA to streamline the FDA approval process for generics and avoid "needlessly costly, duplicative" clinical trials.
282 It provided nonpatent marketing exclusivity to drugs that introduce new active ingredients to encourage research and development, 283 while granting a 180-day marketing exclusivity period to the first ANDA-IV applicant to encourage generic challenges. 284 Finally, it granted generic firms safe harbor while they conduct experiments reasonably related to FDA approval, 285 while providing an automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval to patent holders who bring timely patent infringement suits.
286
In 2003, when Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act, it only required settlements to be filed with the FTC and DOJ for review. 287 
and Antitrust Law
The Third Circuit's presumptive illegality approach in K-Dur is unsuitable in light of Hatch Waxman's silence regarding settlements. 288 The court improperly forces the parties in the patent infringement suit to litigate their case to final judgment or settle without a reverse payment.
289
But the uncertainty of litigation and potential consequences of an adverse outcome to the plaintiff-patent proprietor, relative to the potential consequences of an adverse outcome to the defendant-patent challenger, help explain how a reverse payment can be rational, rather than unreasonable.
290
On the other hand, the Second Circuit's "scope of the patent" test approach in Tamoxifen is no more satisfactory. As K-Dur correctly criticizes, the Tamoxifen test effectively "assumes" that the underlying patent is valid, and asks instead whether the parties' settlement falls within the "scope of the patent."
291
If an agreement falls within the scope of the patent, it poses no antitrust concern; if it does not, then the court applies antitrust scrutiny.
292
But if the patent is not valid in the first instance, then it has no scope at all. 293 The primary beneficiaries of this test are those who hold weak patents.
294
C. The Supreme Court Should Adopt a Patent-Centric Standard of Antitrust Review
Appropriate antitrust analysis of reverse payment settlements must subject the patent to scrutiny. The quick look test disregards the patent and the scope of the patent test assumes its validity. Only Judge Pooler's test, articulated in her dissent in Tamoxifen, recommends evaluating the strength of the patent at the time of the reverse payment settlement. This approach harmonizes the exclusive principles of patent law with the procompetitive principles of antitrust law.
The Tamoxifen case presented a relatively simple evaluation of the strength of the patent-there, at the time the parties entered into the settlement at issue, the district court had recently ruled that Zeneca's tamoxifen patent was invalid because the NDA filer had withheld critical testing information from the PTO. 297 The question remains how Judge Pooler would have evaluated the strength of the patent in the absence of the district court's ruling, as she does not offer a test for how to evaluate strength of a patent.
Evaluating the strength of a patent is difficult to pinpoint with precision and may be unknowable to the patentee itself, who may enter into multimillion-dollar settlements to insure against random outcomes.
298 But the strength of a patent is critical to determining whether an agreement is anticompetitive. 299 An evaluation of patent strength is therefore a necessary feature to any standard of antitrust review for reverse payment settlements. Determining which factors are relevant to the evaluation should be left to caseby-case adjudication.
The court of competent jurisdiction to review patent strength is the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases. This grant of exclusive jurisdiction reflects a congressional choice to have experts evaluate questions pertaining to technical evidence.
CONCLUSION
The decade-long debate over the legality of reverse payment settlements has had its day in Court. This Note has argued that any standard of antitrust review for reverse payment settlements must involve an evaluation of the patent's strength at the time of 296 See supra Part I.B.4. 297 See supra notes 181-192 and accompanying text. 298 See, e.g., supra notes 179-185. 299 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
settlement. The Federal Circuit is the proper court to review patent strength evaluations given Congress's decision to have appeals involving patent issues reviewed by the Federal Circuit. This would give effect to the legislative intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act while preserving a meaningful place for patent law and antitrust law in the pharmaceutical industry.
